{"id":2284,"date":"2018-04-08T13:29:22","date_gmt":"2018-04-08T21:29:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/trainingpips.com\/?page_id=2284"},"modified":"2019-04-18T03:10:38","modified_gmt":"2019-04-18T11:10:38","slug":"2284-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/ps-102-a-course-outline\/ps-102-understanding-case-summaries\/ps-102-chapter-11-an-introduction-to-statutes-of-limitation\/2284-2\/","title":{"rendered":"PS 102 – Chapter 11 – Article 1 – Statute of Limitations – Sidis vs Brodie Dohrmann Inc"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sidis v. Brodie\/Dohrmann, Inc.
\n<\/strong>117 Wn.2d 325, P.2d 781, Sept. 1991
\n[Nos. 57660-2, 57673-4. En Banc. September 5, 1991.]<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

Facts<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

This case<\/a> resulted from the consolidation of two separate but similar cases originally heard in King County<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sidis v. Brodie\/Dohrmann, Inc., 58 Wn. App. 665, 669, 794 P.2d 1309 (1990)<\/strong><\/span>
\nIn 1984, Michael Sidis, a restaurant cook, was injured when a table-side, alcohol-burning stove exploded as he was refueling it. In 1986, he filed a personal injury action<\/a> against these defendants:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Brodie\/Dohrmann, the company<\/a> which sold the stove to the restaurant;<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. Spring, the Swiss manufacturer of the stove; and<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Cambridge, the importer.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Timely service was made on Brodie\/Dohrmann. Spring and Cambridge were brought into the action<\/a> less than 3 years after the injury by means of a third party<\/a> complaint<\/a> filed against them by Brodie\/Dohrmann, but were not served by Sidis during that period.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Clark v. Pinkman, noted at 59 Wn. App. 1002 (1990), review granted, 116 Wn.2d 1001 (1991)<\/strong><\/span>
    \nLesta Clark’s son was killed by Dexter Pinkman in a pedestrian\/automobile accident. Clark timely filed a     complaint<\/a> for death of a child against Pinkman and the State of Washington. The State was served on the 90th day after filing, but Pinkman was not served until over a week later. The parties stipulated to the State’s dismissal<\/a>, but the trial court denied Pinkman’s motion<\/a> for dismissal<\/a>. The Court of Appeals granted review and, in an unpublished opinion, dismissed the case<\/a> against Pinkman.<\/span><\/p>\n

    TOLLING OF STATUTE – RCW 4.16.170<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/span>
    \nFor the purpose of tolling any     statute of limitations<\/a> an action<\/a> shall be deemed commenced when the complaint<\/a> is filed or summons is served whichever occurs first. If service has not been had on the defendant<\/a> prior to the filing of the complaint<\/a>, the plaintiff shall cause<\/a> one or more of the defendants to be served personally, or commence service by publication within ninety days from the date of filing the complaint<\/a>. If the action<\/a> is commenced by service on one or more of the defendants or by publication, the plaintiff shall file the summons and complaint<\/a> within ninety days from the date of service. If following service, the complaint<\/a> is not so filed, or following filing, service is not so made, the action<\/a> shall be deemed to not have been commenced for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations<\/a>.<\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

    Judicial<\/a> History<\/strong><\/span>
    \n<\/span><\/p>\n

    In the Sidis case<\/a>, the King County<\/a> Superior Court granted a summary judgment<\/a> in favor of all three defendants and the case<\/a> was dismissed for lack of service. The plaintiff appealed and the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal<\/a> due to lack of timely service.<\/span><\/p>\n

    In the Clark case<\/a> the trial court denied a summary judgment<\/a> request from the defendant<\/a>. The defendant<\/a> appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s holding and dismissed the case<\/a> due to lack of timely service. The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment<\/a> to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision.<\/span><\/p>\n

    The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the dismissal<\/a> by the lower courts.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Specific Issues<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. In judicial<\/a> interpretation of statutes, the first rule is “the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require construction.” Should the court interpret the wording of the stature as being ambiguous? No<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n
    2. In a case<\/a> with multiple defendants, does service on one or more defendants within the statute of limitations<\/a> (and within the 90 days of filing if applicable which it was in this case<\/a>) toll the statute of limitations<\/a> on the remaining unserved defendants? Yes<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n
    3. Must a plaintiff proceed in a timely manner to serve unserved defendants or risk losing the right to proceed against them if the served defendant<\/a>(s) are dismissed? Yes<\/strong><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Holdings<\/strong><\/span>
      \nRCW 4.16.170 is not ambiguous.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Review of case<\/a> was granted on one issue only: that being whether, under RCW 4.16.170, service of process on one defendant<\/a> tolls the statute of limitation as to unserved defendants. The Supreme Court held it does toll the statute.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Reasoning<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      The purpose of the statute of limitations<\/a> is to compel actions to be commenced within what the legislature deemed to be a reasonable<\/a> time, and not postponed indefinitely. However, the statute’s operation could be tolled for what the legislature regarded as a good reason.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Strictly speaking, any tolling statute “effectively negate[s] the purpose of a statute of limitations<\/a>”. Here, the Legislature could well have reasoned that plaintiffs in multidefendant actions should receive this extra protection from the harsh effects of the statute of limitation.<\/span><\/p>\n

      It is arguably unfair to require a plaintiff to serve all defendants within a set limitation period, when it may<\/a> be difficult or impossible to determine the actual location of some defendants before discovery<\/a> is underway. Statutes of limitation are procedural rules that are properly the realm of the Legislature, and the fairness of such statutes should generally be left to the Legislature to determine.<\/span><\/p>\n

      In judicial<\/a> interpretation of statutes, the first rule is “the court should assume that the legislature means exactly what it says. Plain words do not require construction.”<\/span><\/p>\n

      The statute regarding the commencement of a civil<\/a> action<\/a> is RCW 4.16.170 and says in part: “If the action<\/a> is commenced by service on one or more of the defendants…” The Supreme Court interpreted this language exactly as it is written and ruled that since one of the defendants had been served the case<\/a> had been commenced thus effectively tolling the statute of limitations<\/a> on the unserved defendants.<\/span><\/p>\n

      C4PSE Comment<\/strong><\/span>
      \nThis is one of the most important rulings in the history of modern process serving in Washington. It is not at all unusual for process servers to receive service assignments where the final deadline for service is within the 90 day tolling period afforded by RCW 4.16.170. This is especially worrisome in regards an auto tort or other personal injury       case<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

      Sidis provides that in multiple defendant<\/a> cases, service on one of the defendants tolls the statute of limitations<\/a> in regards all other defendants. This tolling is in effect so long as the served defendant<\/a> is not dismissed from the case<\/a> before the remaining defendant<\/a>(s) are served.<\/span><\/p>\n

      In a multiple defendant<\/a> situation facing a statute of limitations<\/a> it is best to get all of the defendants served before the statute expires. However, as noted by the court, this is not always possible. <\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Sidis v. Brodie\/Dohrmann, Inc. 117 Wn.2d 325, P.2d 781, Sept. 1991 [Nos. 57660-2, 57673-4. En Banc. September 5, 1991.] Facts This case<\/a> resulted from the consolidation of two separate but similar cases originally heard in King County<\/a>. Sidis v. Brodie\/Dohrmann, Inc., 58 Wn. App. 665, 669, 794 P.2d 1309 (1990) In 1984, Michael Sidis, a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"parent":2282,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2284","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2284","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2284"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2284\/revisions"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2282"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.trainingpips.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2284"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}